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Introduction. 
 
Organization theory still has difficulties dealing with multinationals as distinctive 
organizations. Ghoshal and Westney’s (1993) classic collection of essays entitled 
‘Organization theory and the Multinational corporation’ did little to shift the study of 
multinationals away from the dominant economistic view present in international 
business (see also Westney and Zaheer 2001). It is only in the last few years that 
organization scholars have seriously returned to the problem of multinationals. Like 
many areas, it is the impact of institutionalist theory, in its various guises, that has 
contributed to this process. Institutionalism at its core rejects economistic explanations 
about firms, their strategy and structure. Instead it is concerned with how the social 
embeddedness of firms in particular contexts shapes their structures and processes. Only 
recently, however, have institutionalists begun to explore the consequences of the 
pluralistic nature of social embeddedness processes in multinationals. We argue that the 
main contribution of this research has been to construct a model of the multinational in 
which there are multiple sites of micro-politics resulting from the clash between 
different actors within the firm utilizing resources derived from their institutional and 
organizational context to pursue their own agendas. In itself this is a significant 
corrective to rational and economistic models of the multinational. However, in this 
paper we argue that institutionalist analysis needs to go further by firstly identifying the 
key sites of micro-political conflicts in the multinational and secondly showing how 
these add together to create a distinctive configuration of actors within the multinational 
with specific consequences for the broader political economy.  
 
 
The paper proceeds in the following sections.  Firstly we consider the contribution of 
institutionalist analysis to the understanding of multinationals. The tension which we 
identify in institutionalist theory is between those approaches which emphasise 
isomorphic tendencies in multinationals and those approaches which identify continued 
trends towards divergence. Rather than seeing these as irreconcilable approaches to 
multinationals, however, we argue that they share a common interest in the impact of 
diverse institutional settings on multinationals and on relations within the firm.  This 
diversity is the basis for conflicts and micro-political struggles over the nature of 
management and work in subsidiaries, divisions and headquarters. Although all 
organizations may be characterised as ‘political’ and ‘conflictual’ in this way, it is the 
structured nature of difference arising from institutional distinctiveness that, we argue, 
makes micro-politics essential to an understanding of multinationals. What is needed, 
therefore, is a clear framework for understanding how institutions shape these micro-
political struggles and the consequences of this for the MNC as a firm. In the second 
section, we present our framework which is based on the interaction of inside 
organizational and outside institutional contexts. In organizational terms, the senior 
managers of MNCs seek to create various forms of order through the firm in order to 
enact particular strategic objectives. This involves the transfer of processes, people and 
resources to ensure that subsidiaries follow the goals of the MNC.  Actors in the various 
parts of the firm respond to this not simply as participants in the achievement of a 
common goal but also as social actors with interests constructed and shaped by their 
institutional context.  The resulting outcome is one of diverse micro-political struggles 
structured by particular configurations of organizational and institutional processes. 
However, in itself this is not sufficient to understand the dynamics of these processes in 
multinationals. In the third section, therefore, we add into this analysis the distinctive 
importance of capital markets to multinationals and the consequence of this 
interdependency. We argue that the way in which these operate is increasingly 
intensifying micro-political action within multinationals as it pressurises senior 
managers to engage in rapid structural and processual changes in order to satisfy capital 
market demands. The instability which arises from this constant process of change and 
restructuring, increases uncertainty and risk for the various components of the firm. 
This reinforces the importance for individuals and groups of engaging in micro-political 
action inside and outside the firm in order to try to protect their position. This quickly 
turns into a vicious circle of increased micro-political action leading to increased 
uncertainty etc.. In the concluding section, we argue that the susceptibility of the 
multinational to these processes makes it a precarious organizational form with a 
serious ‘legitimacy deficit’. We argue that this requires further examination if we are 
going to develop further the institutionalist approach to multinationals.  
  
Varieties of Institutionalism 
Our goal in this section is not to produce a comprehensive account of institutionalist 
theories but instead to concentrate on the two dominant varieties of institutionalism, 
which have been used in recent years to analyse multinationals. These two varieties of 
institutionalism we label as organizational institutionalism and comparative historical 
institutionalism. The common general starting point for these theories is that 
organizations are shaped by the institutional context in which they are located. 
 
For organizational institutionalism, institutions are taken for granted ways of acting, 
which derive from shared regulative, cognitive and normative frames. To be considered 
legitimate, organizations must conform to relevant institutional expectations. 
Institutionalisation is a process whereby, over time, regulative, cognitive and normative 
frames in particular areas of social and economic life become more consistent and 
coherent, thereby making it more difficult for organizations to deviate from the 
expected model. The key issues which emerge from this are what institutional rules 
govern particular fields, how did these rules emerge, which social actors develop, 
maintain or change rules, how do these social actors enrol others behind their project 
and how does change occur and new rules and understandings become institutionalised.  
 
In terms of research on multinationals within this stream of institutionalist theory, the 
main relevant contribution comes in a series of papers by Kostova and colleagues 
(Kostova 1999; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Kostova and Roth 2002). Kostova has 
argued that the multinational subsidiary is in a situation of ‘institutional duality’ On the 
one hand, it is pressurised by the headquarters to adopt a particular set of practices 
derived from the home base of the firm; on the other hand, the subsidiary is pressurised 
by its host context to follow local practices. The subsidiary faces the question of which 
set of institutions are more important to it – those that make it legitimate within the 
multinational or those which legitimate it in its local context? The greater the 
‘institutional distance’ between the home and host countries, the greater the difficulty 
for the HQ of successfully transferring practices from one to the other (Kostova and 
Roth 2002; also Xu and Shenkar 2002) and the more likely host influences will prevail. 
Kostova and Roth’s findings are that ‘practice adoption vary across foreign subsidiaries 
as a result of two factors – the institutional environment in the host country and the 
relational context within the MNC’ (Kostova and Roth 2002: 227). By relational context 
is meant the degree of dependence, trust and identity between the subsidiary and the 
head office. In combination, institutional duality and the relational context produce four 
types of subsidiary response to head office initiatives – which they label as ‘active’, 
‘minimal’, ‘assent’ and ‘ceremonial’ (op.cit.: 229). Kostova’s emphasis is on the 
relationship between single subsidiaries and the head office. She does not seek to extend 
her discussion to model the consequences of institutional dualism for the multinational 
as a whole.  
 
The other important strand of institutionalism we have labelled as comparative and historical. 
Many of its proponents (Hall and Soskice 2001, Whitley 1999, Amable 2003) begin from the 
idea that societies develop complementary institutions that shape the rules by which 
organizations operate. From the point of view of studying multinationals, therefore, the 
question is how does the multinational respond to the institutional diversity existing between 
the home and the host context in terms of organizational structures, practices and processes 
(see Morgan et al. 2001 for a variety of responses)?  Whitley (2001), for example, begins 
from the perspective of the MNC HQ and argues that MNCs as firms build their managerial 
hierarchies, learn to exercise authority, construct markets and business networks, employ 
workers in a way that is highly influenced by the distinct national institutions of their home 
setting. When they go global, they will take these practices, national templates and routines of 
control and coordination with them and create subsidiaries that reflect the organizational 
forms of their home country (for empirical studies of MNCs which support this emphasis, see 
Whitley et al. 2003; Morgan et al 2003; Lane 1998; 2000; 2001; also Geppert et al.2002; 
2003). Given that firms have self-knowledge about their skills and capabilities, this means 
that they tend to look for institutional environments either where their practices already ‘fit’ to 
some degree or where institutional constraints on firms are weak, allowing the MNC to 
reproduce its home model. 
 
Recently some authors within the comparative institutionalist perspective have given 
more emphasis to the importance of the local host context. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2001; 
2005), in particular, argue that because subsidiaries have been and are operating in 
distinct local institutional settings, they will build their organizational practices on host 
country institutional foundations and will not simply reflect the home based practices of 
the multinational. Prosperous subsidiaries mobilize national institutional resources to 
gain social space, economic importance and political power within a MNC (see also 
Belanger et al. 1999 for a study which reveals the importance of the local institutional 
context). Again the subsidiary becomes a site of adaptation but, contrary to Whitley, the 
main emphasis is placed on the local institutional context. What unites both of these 
perspectives is that they see the MNC as a contested terrain, a transnational social space, 
in which subsidiaries and headquarters engage in negotiation and conflict over a 
multiplicity of possible future forms, directions and destinies for the MNC by drawing 
on the institutional advantages of their host locations (see also Morgan 2001a,b).. 
 
More recently, authors have explicitly labelled these processes in terms of ‘micro-
politics’ in which the drive from the MNC headquarters towards isomorphism is 
undermined by the capability of local actors to pursue different interests (see e.g. 
Dorrenbacher and Geppert 2005; Geppert and Mayer 2006; Geppert and Matten 2006; 
Geppert and Williams 2006). One of the most intensive research programmes in this 
vein has been conducted by Ferner and his colleagues in a series of articles reporting on 
US multinationals and their subsidiaries in the UK. They have shown how ‘the 
“isomorphic pulls” exerted by corporate headquarters were not sufficient to 
ensure…subsidiary “acquiescence” – that is, full compliance in form and spirit with 
institutional pressures…managers were able to derive bargaining resources from their 
rootedness within the specific institutional configuration of the host country’ (Ferner et 
al. 2005b: 316; see also Ferner et al. 2005a; Ferner et al. 2004; Ferner et al. 2006). In 
this approach institutions act in a reinforcing complementary way to make certain forms 
of behaviour and processes the accepted ways of doing things. However, actors are not 
bound to follow these requirements. They may act strategically to further their interests 
within these constraints (Crouch 2005). In contexts of ‘dual institutional’ pressures, the 
range of manoeuvre for actors is increased as they can draw on various institutional 
resources from the home and host context. As these contexts are also evolving and not 
static (Marquez 2005), there is actually no single logic inside national systems but a 
plurality of logics, some hidden, some overt (Crouch 2005; Morgan 2005; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005). Thus actors in subsidiaries are not driven into either conformity or 
resistance but ‘appear to demonstrate considerable space, within structural constraints, 
for managerial “strategic choice” (Ferner et al. 2005b: 317). This fits with recent 
reworkings of comparative historical institutionalism which are aiming to bring a more 
dynamic perspective into the relationship between institutions, actors and firms (e.g. 
Crouch 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Morgan et al. 2005; Thelen 2005, Kristensen, 
2005). The common strand which links these perspectives is a recognition that firms are 
not static recipients of institutional contexts but are rather involved in a complex and 
dynamic interaction with institutions at the national and international level (see also 
Elger and Smith 2005 for a multi-level analysis of Japanese MNCs and their 
subsidiaries in the UK).  
 
In conclusion, both forms of institutionalism reject economistic explanations of how 
MNCs and their subsidiaries work. In each approach the emphasis is laid on the social 
processes that lead them to develop in particular ways. In organizational 
institutionalism, the emphasis is on isomorphic processes but there is recognition that 
this is not an abstract process but something that happens (a) as a result of certain 
actions and (b) in particular contexts. In comparative and historical institutionalism, the 
concept of society as a set of complementary institutions, which shape how firms evolve 
lies at the heart of an understanding of multinationals. For both types of institutionalism, 
the recognition of different institutional contexts means that multinationals embody 
diverse local logics. From this emerges the strong sense of micro-politics inside these 
firms as actors use different institutional resources to strengthen or defend their 
position. In summary, the contribution of these institutionalist arguments is:  
• A rejection of economistic accounts of multinationals;  
• A focus on the social embeddedness of organizational practices in different 
institutional contexts;  
• A concern for the ambiguity and uncertainty which this creates inside the 
multinational;  
• A recognition of the role of politics in the working out of these ambiguities;  
• A concern for the degree of isomorphism and divergence which remains within 
and between multinationals;  
• An interest in power and the ability of different actors within the multinational 
to shape the transfer, diffusion and implementation of organizational practices.  
However, our purpose in writing this paper is to go further than simply identifying the 
existence of micro-politics based on institutional difference. We aim to provide a 
framework that can inform the study of multinationals from an institutionalist 
perspective, capturing the variety of levels involved in the analysis as well as the key 
relationships.  
 
In our view, the MNC as a totality may be seen as a highly complex configuration of 
ongoing micro political power conflicts at different levels in which strategizing social 
actors/groups inside and outside the firm interact with each other and create temporary 
balances of power that shape how formal organizational relationships and processes 
actually work in practice. Institutions enter into these processes, firstly as co-constitutors 
of the set of actors/groupings and their mutual roles and identities, secondly as forms of 
restriction on the choices actors make, thirdly as resources that empower actors and 
finally as rule-givers for the games that emerge.  
 
The concern of institutionalist theory with ‘institutional diversity’ and the consequent 
spheres of ambiguity and uncertainty which are created suggests that one way to move 
from particular micro-political processes to a framework for such processes is to focus 
on the distinction between the global organizational framework of the multinational and 
its senior management, (i.e. its straining for a coherent set of practices and procedures 
within its organizational boundaries irrespective of institutional boundaries) and its local 
constituent parts embedded in their own institutional context. The multinational seeks to 
create this coherence and order through a number of mechanisms. To simplify matters, 
we identify two categories of mechanisms associated with transfers between the head 
office and its subsidiaries, often via divisional headquarters. The first mechanism is the 
transfer of practices, policies, processes and work systems sometimes associated with 
benchmarking procedures that measure factors such as size of the workforce, 
profitability, inventory, productivity etc.. These measures become the basis for demands 
that all subsidiaries live up to the best practice, Failure to do this leads to threats that 
production facilities will be moved from the low performing plant to a high performing 
plant, what has been termed the use of ‘coercive comparisons. The second category of 
mechanisms of transfer we label as transfer of resources, covering financial capital (i.e. 
investment funds for new products or processes), knowledge capital (transfer of 
individuals and activities to a subsidiary to become a ‘centre for R+D excellence) and 
reputational capital (the recognition of a particular subsidiary as a leader in its field). In 
both mechanisms, we are particularly concerned with the interaction between different 
sorts of managers and these processes. 
 
Drawing on the existing analyses of institutional settings, our second dimension 
concerns the degree to which local settings are likely to be active in either resistance to, 
or adaptation of, these transfers. Here we draw on the well-known distinction between 
types of capitalism. Those settings that are characterised by cohesive and cooperative 
employment relations, strong links to the local institutional setting (training and skills, 
innovation and supply networks, collective employer and worker representation bodies – 
a characterisation which reflects what Hall and Soskice label as a ‘coordinated market 
economy’) are likely to respond to transfers with resistance. In these contexts, 
employees, in particular, tend to have high skills and expectations of consultation and 
involvement in the workplace. Transfers that threaten these skills or are introduced 
without consultation are likely to be resisted where they threaten existing patterns of 
authority and the division of labour. Where transfers are potentially more positive for 
the subsidiary, it is likely that local actors will be more likely to absorb and adapt to 
these processes than accept them wholesale. In settings which are characterised by 
conflictual and low skill employee relations and weak links into local networks (‘liberal 
market economies’ in Hall and Soskice’s model but perhaps more accurately described 
at the organizational level by Whitley’s term as ‘isolated hierarchies’ (Whitley 1999)), 
employees have little capacity for organized resistance. In the following sections, we 
elaborate on these arguments. The following table gives an initial summary of the types 
of micro-politics embedded in the MNC. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Types of micro-politics in MNCs 
 Transfer to subsidiaries 
of practices, processes, 
policies and work 
systems within a 
framework of 
benchmarking and 
‘coercive comparisons’ 
Transfer to subsidiaries of 
financial capital (for new 
investment), knowledge 
capital (to become R+D 
centre) and reputational 
capital (to become 
exemplar of a process) 
High  
resistance 
to HO: 
cohesive 
subsidiary 
with strong 
links to 
local 
institutional 
supports  
Micro-politics of 
information shaping and 
collective resistance 
through overt and covert 
mechanisms drawing 
together managers, 
employees and local 
institutions. 
Micro-politics of aggressive 
bargaining for advantage 
using local institutional 
advantages 
Low 
resistance 
to  HO: 
Lack of 
cohesion, 
weak local 
embedding 
Information compliant 
Susceptibility to breaking 
up of existing practices 
and replacement by 
‘global’ standards: micro-
politics of unorganized 
resistance 
Ineffective in competition 
for resources except under 
special circumstances. 
Ineffectual micropolitics 
with HQ.  
 
Types of Micro-politics 
In this section, we examine in more detail the types of micro-politics that emerge in 
MNCs. We consider the two types of transfer and the sorts of micro-politics that emerge 
around them.  
 
Transfer to subsidiaries of practices, processes, policies and work systems within a 
framework of benchmarking and ‘coercive comparisons’ 
It is clear that a number of factors affect the degree to which MNCs seek to transfer 
practices and processes. The first of these relates to the strategy of the MNC which in 
turn is affected by sectoral patterns of competition and organizational structuring. As 
has been pointed out in the international business literature (Bartlett, Ghoshal and 
Birkinshaw 2003), MNCs vary in the nature of their strategy towards subsidiaries on at 
least two counts – firstly, how integral the subsidiary is to the profitability of the firm 
and secondly whether its output is aimed at the local market in which the subsidiary is 
located home market or whether it is part of a global production chain organized by the 
head office. If profitability is low and connection to the wider MNC limited, the 
subsidiary is in a weak political position vis-à-vis head office demands. If it is highly 
profitable, it becomes more valuable to the MNC and therefore has more power. The 
second and associated feature that affects the strategy of the MNC  relates to the 
institutional origins of the MNC. Research now shows that US MNCs tend to manage 
their subsidiaries through tight financial and performance controls and the adaptation of 
centrally devised HRM policies to the local context. UK MNCs are similar in their 
focus on financial and performance controls but tend to be looser in imposing central 
HR policies (Ferner et al 2004; 2005a; 2005b). Japanese firms seek to reproduce as 
closely as possible their home system of production and achieve this through 
maintaining a high number of technical expatriates in place and retaining strong links 
with ‘mother plants’ in Japan that have the obligation of aiding the overseas plant in 
improvement processes (Morgan et al 2003; Whitley et al. 2003). German firms have 
become increasingly willing to adapt to and learn from local conditions whilst retaining 
a strong oversight of the budget and technical developments (.Ferner and Varul 1999; 
2000: Geppert et al.  2003; Lane 2000).  
 
Multinationals, therefore, clearly have different approaches to transferring elements to 
their subsidiaries depending on their markets, their broader strategic objectives and their 
national origins. However, as a general point, these transfers, varying in their nature and 
quality, create challenges for actors in their local contexts as to how they respond. One 
challenge that we wish to emphasise that links to micro-politics is around the transfer of 
information from subsidiaries to headquarters.  Since at least Crozier’s classic study of 
The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Crozier 1964), organization theorists have recognized 
that numbers (whether they are accounting numbers or performance numbers) are 
socially mediated. Divisional and subsidiary managers in multinationals are not simply 
‘representing’ numbers, they are interpreting and constructing them, learning how to 
make them “come out right”. It would be naïve to assume that even powerful managers 
can control the numbers as much as they might like over the long term but it is within 
this framing that we can see micro-politics occurring as actors in different positions 
engage in competitive modes of interpretation and explanation. Transfers of processes, 
policies, work systems etc. occur in order to improve performance and it is in this 
context that information becomes a crucial area of uncertainty and conflict. How the 
numbers are constructed and interpreted and who is made the ‘hero’ or ‘scapegoat’ is 
primarily determined by senior managers who ultimately have the power to reward or 
discipline on the basis of their interpretation. Those at the top have the right to allocate 
blame, which therefore “falls on unwary and inexperienced underlings” (Jackall 1988).  
 
Responding to this uncertainty, other managers have a variety of options. They must 
consider how to make strategic moves that enroll them as members of coalitions so that 
firstly they do not get individually blamed for poor numbers and secondly so that they 
become part of an informal network of managers bound together by shared perspectives, 
inter-related careers and reputational interdependence. The two most obvious groupings 
are firstly where managers commit to the goals of the organization and participate fully 
in the numbers game using success to move quickly from one position in the MNC to 
another, so that they may be able to allocate the blame for their own mistakes on their 
successors in a process of ‘outrunning their mistakes’. Certainly, the likelihood of this 
has been significantly affected by the speed and frequency of organizational 
restructurings and other management changes emerging from the effort to placate the 
capital markets. Thus these managers potentially become participants in the creation of 
a category of global managers showing loyalty (at least in the short-term) to the 
objective of the MNC’s headquarters and its strategy rather than to any local 
subsidiaries and local coalitions of actors . The second strategy, however, is for 
managers to become more deeply embedded in their local institutional context, pursuing 
their interests less within the multinational and more within the network of local 
institutions and  firms.  
 
In countries or regions where managerial careers are primarily judged in terms of 
achieving the targets passed on by headquarters and managers’ promotion possibilities 
are decided internally and externally by these achievements, then lower level, subsidiary 
managers are likely to act in concert with the numbers game, i.e. to prove that they can 
manage their subsidiary so as to meet shifting fashions in bench marking in the most 
significant way. We can use the findings of comparative institutional analysis to argue 
that these sorts of managers are more likely to emerge in contexts where institutions are 
weak, the power of the organization over employees is strong and there is weak 
resistance to the imposition of outside practices and processes of coercive condition. 
The micro-politics in such contexts is one where the subsidiary is likely to be 
information compliant, as it is led by managers who perceive their future in terms of 
cooperating with senior managers if they are going to build a successful career inside or 
outside the firm. However, as these managers see themselves involved in a competitive, 
individualistic race, there will be an attempt to put the best light on one’s own 
achievements and move on before longer-term problems might emerge. These contexts 
are susceptible to frequent restructurings in response to head office demands and as 
individual managers seek to show their own distinctive skills in the battle for 
promotion. Resistance from employees is weak and employment rights are limited. 
Only limited support can be drawn from the local context for struggles within the firm.  
 
At the other end of the scale, however, are managers that are operating in localities or 
countries that have a tradition of focusing on more long-term developmental goals for 
the firm. Such managers face a difficult trade-off. If they simply follow the new 
institutional logic they may ruin their personal reputation locally or nationally if it gets 
known that they have played their cards to meet short term bench-marks in such a way 
that they get promoted by harming a local subsidiary. In some contexts, there may exist 
a very well-developed locally shared “system for tracing responsibility” as employees 
and colleagues within and among firms are narrating the biographies of individual 
managers and creating stories as to their performance; a narration that may wind up with 
the common perception that the manager is part of the local community rather than part 
of the MNC. Managers that opt for a local career may choose to play in such a way that 
they cultivate their local reputation at the cost of their global career, accepting the risk 
of being fired or downgraded by the MNC but comfortable with the knowledge that 
they have a strong reputation locally that can be advantageously leveraged in the right 
circumstances. 
 
Locally embedded managers are more likely to be found where institutions are strong, 
networks between local firms and local associations and local government are 
supportive and where support for the development of employee skills and employee 
representation is also important. Actors feel more deeply embedded in the local context 
and are less dependent on the MNC. Subsidiaries are characterized by the micro-politics 
of information shaping (led by local managers) and the potential for collective 
resistance through overt and covert mechanisms (led by employee representation 
bodies). Local bodies and local networks of firms and employees are likely to be 
supportive of these approaches.  
 
In the real world, we recognise that there are likely to be a variety of responses between 
these two extremes.  As with all such theorising, however, we seek to clarify the 
argument in order that more detailed research can develop the nuances along this 
dimension. 
 
Transfer to subsidiaries of financial capital (for new investment), knowledge 
capital (to become an R+D centre) and reputational capital (to become an 
exemplar of a particular process, product or service) 
In this section, we consider the micro-politics that emerge from the ability of the head 
office of the MNC to distribute resources and rewards within its boundaries. How is it 
possible to win these competitions for resources? Our argument is that this creates 
rather an interesting set of micro-political processes once we examine the question from 
an institutional perspective. 
 
As already discussed, there is a large literature that examines the range of strategies 
which subsidiaries may adopt in their approach to headquarters and its distribution of 
rewards and resources as they seek to reduce uncertainty and promote their interests 
within the multinational as a whole (see e.g. Birkinshaw 1997, 2000; Birkinshaw and 
Hood 1998). A crucial point, however, is that in this internal competition for resources, 
mandates etc., it is often unclear how the rules are going to be interpreted by senior 
managers and how the numbers are going to be read. It is a common story in the closure 
of subsidiaries by multinationals that the local plant did everything that was asked of it 
and yet still became the victim of the MNC’s axe. Thus conformity to what are 
perceived to be the rules is not a guarantee of anything. In an interesting discussion, 
Delaney (1998) has sought to understand this problem by distinguishing between what 
he describes as “Boy Scout” and “Subversive” strategies in MNCs, a distinction which 
we elaborate on. Again we develop the argument at the extreme in order that more 
detailed research can reveal the more complex picture between these two polar 
opposites. 
 
Boy Scout subsidiaries follow the demands of the head office and do not seek to 
develop or go beyond their existing mandate. They are likely to be led by global 
managers for whom building a career in the managerial labour market (both internal and 
external to the organization) is the main concern. As a result these managers’ main 
concern is to impress head office with their commitment to its goals. They seek to 
implement the bench-marking and other practices that head office recommends. They 
participate in competitions to extend their mandates as they are instructed by the head 
office. There is of course no problem with Boy Scout subsidiaries so long as all 
subsidiaries are acting this way.  It is when others are acting in different and more 
innovative ways that Boy Scouts become problematic. In multinationals with 
subsidiaries in diverse institutional settings, there are likely to be other responses, some 
of which may be more profitable for the MNC. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how 
Boy Scout subsidiaries do not undermine their own position in the MNC since they 
increasingly become like clones of each other subsidiary as they restructure according to 
global best practices defined by the head office. The more they become similar, the 
more they make their performance easily comparable with other plants in a similar 
position, in turn making it easier for the multinational to rank performance and decide to 
concentrate production in one of the similar sites and close down the others. In 
implementing processes from outside, it undermines any distinctive competitive 
advantage it might have had deriving from its own history and culture. Potentially this 
also has serious consequences for the MNC as it may come to consist of a range of 
similar subsidiaries with little room for the diversity that is necessary for innovation.  
 
Subversive strategists, on the other hand, are characterized by a continuous search for 
mandate extension whatever the rules which the headquarters is trying to operate about 
the appropriate way to win support for this. ‘Subversive strategists’ are likely to be led 
by local managers deeply embedded in local networks and unwilling to capitulate to 
head office demands that may undermine these local networks. Thus they may treat the 
MNC as just one arena of many in which they participate. For example, they may 
evolve strong networks and links into international, national and local markets, 
networks and institutions without seeking permission for this from the MNC HO. 
Indeed their ties with these other actors may become more intense and in some ways 
more significant (at least for the long-term future of the subsidiary) than their ties with 
the headquarters. Reflecting this, Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) show how a number of 
subsidiaries in their MNC case study (which had previously been independent firms) 
actively “applied for membership” of the multinational as a way to realize their own 
strategy. Further, they tried – with different degrees of success – to pursue such 
independent strategies after they had achieved this membership.  
 
As Kristensen and Zeitlin (2001, 2005) point out, whether subsidiaries play their roles 
in a Boy Scout way or are more subversively following their own distinctive route is 
also dependent on how far they accept the head office as a legitimate form of authority 
which can dictate how they are to act. Some subsidiary managers simply accept this as 
legitimate and follow orders without complaint (though, of course, employees might be 
rather less quiescent); others may perceive the MNC more as a gentleman’s agreements 
among peers where negotiation is essential; some may think of the MNC as a new form 
of protected home market offering stability and potentially room for new expansion; a 
final group see the entire corporation as an ongoing system of competition, where it is 
always good to struggle for enlarging one’s economic and political space inside and 
outside the corporation.  
 
Subversive strategists make novel use of their local social institutions, suppliers, labour 
markets etc.. In this way they rather spur experimentation within national and local 
contexts in ways that may deepen comparative advantages and distinct ways of 
organizing employees and making use of skills etc. Their formal structure and how they 
measure performance is not so important to them as their ability to use internal 
resources and external networks in highly entrepreneurial and very unpredictable ways 
as seen from the MNC HQ. In terms of their practices, such subsidiaries may  become 
increasingly de-coupled from the MNC even though their skills and capacities are often 
crucial to the innovative capabilities of the MNC. Instead such subsidiaries deepen their 
capacities by becoming increasingly tightly coupled to the core attributes of the national 
institutional context or the local industrial district in which they are located, in terms of 
their dependence on local configurations of skill, cooperation and knowledge transfer. 
In so far as they build external networks, they build them as much to other places 
around the world that possess similar or complementary capabilities. Such networks are 
valuable for continuing to upgrade the capacities of the local subsidiary, a process to 
which the MNC itself seems weakly attuned. 
 
From the more subversive end of the scale, managers are able to be successful if they 
are able to achieve two objectives. Firstly they need to be able to collaborate internally 
in the subsidiary across different groups. Secondly they need to be able to mobilize 
local, national and international resources by collaborating with suppliers, unions, 
vocational training and R&D institutions. Both of these conditions, if met successfully, 
can turn local cooperation into favorable outcomes for the MNC but at the expense of 
simultaneously distancing the subsidiary from the strategy and intent of the MNC head 
office (Kristensen and Zeitlin,op.cit.: ch 7; Sölvell and Zander, 1998).  As Sölvell and 
Zander (1998) point out, this may also imply that the better performing subsidiaries are 
those that increasingly become tightly integrated with their host localities and for whom 
ties to the multinational become, if not weaker, then less and less important for directing 
their overall development. Some of them might even wish to be sold to other MNCs or 
to be offered opportunities for management buy-outs, if their ability to collaborate 
locally is hampered by MNC policies (e.g. towards suppliers, in terms of allocating 
R&D and product mandates). Often in such subsidiaries there is a strong sense of what 
it takes to do good business (technologically, in relation to customers, employees, etc) 
and this feel for the “local” and larger competitive game may in many ways run counter 
to the new institutional logic and method of control of the MNC .  
 
As we discuss in the next section, many subsidiaries have been bought and sold so many 
times that their experiences have taught them that they should follow a subversive 
strategy that reinforces their indigenous strengths rather than simply follow the dictates 
of the MNC HQ. Developing their own strengths means that they become distinctive 
and even where the MNC decides to get rid of them they may be able to actively sell 
themselves to an alternative and possibly “better” owner. Such stable and consistent 
strategies in the subsidiary in the midst of an MNC engaged in constant restructuring at 
the level of formal structure requires the ability to engage in skilful micro-politics, 
performing to the standards of the MNC whilst trying to ensure that distinctive 
capabilities, built out of the institutional context, are extended and not destroyed. 
Subversives are unlikely to survive if they do not deliver the goods to the head office 
but nor can they survive if they neglect to build their independent networks and 
capacities for action. 
 
The broader context: capital markets and MNCs 
If we are to understand the intensity, urgency and significance of these micro-political 
processes, it is necessary to briefly focus on a particular arena that gets limited 
discussion in many institutionalist accounts of MNCs – that is the context of ownership, 
capital markets and the relationship with senior managers. Whilst we recognize that this 
is a huge topic, we simply want to point to its importance in developing an 
institutionalist account of multinationals. Again, we make our argument clear whilst 
recognizing that in reality there are likely to be a complex layer of relationships and that 
these need further examination through detailed research.  
 
It is in the capital markets that the basic drive for restructuring occurs and it is thus from 
here that a major impetus towards uncertainty, risk and micro-politics inside the MNC 
grow. In the most developed capital market systems of the UK and the US, the financial 
performance of firms is highly monitored by players in the capital markets and failure to 
meet the expectations of these players has immediate repercussions for managers 
through falls in share price. Thus senior managers of firms are engaged in a game with 
members of the institutional investor nexus in terms of achieving certain levels of 
performance (see Froud et al. 2000; 2006; Lazonick 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000; Williams 2000; Golding 2001). What this institutional set of players offer MNCs 
is access to financial resources by which they can not only finance their debts but also 
speed up their growth. In return, the institutional investment nexus create disciplinary 
mechanisms over firms if they fail to perform.  
 
The crucial mechanism for mediating these pressures lies in the senior managers’ 
abilities to restructure and reorder the firm to reduce costs and increase efficiency at the 
same time explaining and justifying these processes in a discourse acceptable to the key 
players in the institutional equity nexus (see Froud et al 2006; section1; ch.5). For the 
senior managers of multinationals, in particular, this links to the development and 
application of benchmarks for performance at different levels and sites in the 
organization. As discussed previously, these various and often changing benchmarks 
become the means for senior managers to judge performance across sites and to 
leverage local managers and employees in to higher levels of performance. It is at this 
point that subsidiary managers receive these pressures and evolve their responses either 
towards Boy Scout strategies where they transfer the onus on to workers and suppliers 
in terms of higher productivity, lower wages and lower prices or as ‘subversives’ seek 
to develop cooperative ways of meeting these demands without overturning local 
expectations.. Under the names of “investment-bargaining” or ‘regime shopping’, HQs 
seek to play off subsidiaries against each other, forcing them to show up with the best 
benchmarks in order to be favoured in investment or head-count decisions  (Mueller, 
1996; Mueller and Purcell, 1992). Whilst Boy Scouts cooperate with the undermining of 
their own subsidiary (a prospect that divides the workforce between the managers, for 
whom the locality is a temporary step on a path to steps up the internal or external 
labour market, and the workers, most of whom are likely to be locked into the local 
labour market), subversive strategists work to coordinate local cooperative responses to 
such pressures. Investment-bargaining and regime-shopping was a way for senior 
managers to placate capital markets, when the alternative might be possible hostile take-
over bids with the eventual loss of personal prestige and position. Complaining local 
managers just demonstrated their lack of understanding of the larger pattern of the 
global game, if they argued that official strategies were utterly irrelevant for their 
businesses and that bench-marks only gave bad insights into their performance more 
generally. When they could not reach bench-marks, ROI or any new indicator on 
performance, this would be labeled as ‘bad excuses’ (Bélanger et al. 1999).  
 
Companies clearly find it difficult to survive in a stable organizational form in capital 
markets which are highly liquid, where investment bankers construct lists of vulnerable 
companies and growing firms, whilst venture capitalists and others are prepared to 
invest in major restructuring in order to produce a profit further down the line. 
Continuous restructuring not only creates a promise of better things for the future but it 
also makes it more difficult to compare over time, since the object of comparison (the 
company, the division, the subsidiary) is likely to have fundamentally changed its 
shape. For example, Whittington and Mayer report that  ‘20% of the top 50 UK firms 
were engaging in large scale reorganizations every year in the early 1990s, over the last 
five years (1997-2002) the average has climbed above 30%’ (2002: 2-3). Furthermore, 
they argue that large firms now reorganize about once every three years in addition to 
more frequent minor changes such as ‘splitting, merging and swapping amongst sub-
units’ (ibid.). Research at the level of individual companies confirms this. In their study 
of GEC between 1998 and 1998 for example, Froud et al. identified seventy-nine major 
restructuring events involving acquisitions, sell-offs, joint ventures and suchlike, which 
radically changed the shape of the company (2000; 2006 section 2: ch.3).  
 
Clearly there are differences in other systems where capital markets are not yet as 
significant, e.g. Japan but in other settings that were previously sheltered from this such 
as Germany and Finland, it is also impacting (Tainio et al. 2001; Lane 2005; Vitols 
2003). In our view, the consequence of this is that internal actors are firstly faced with 
more uncertainty, secondly this encourages actors and groups to develop strategies for 
survival outside the MNC which currently owns them and that both of these processes 
intensify the sites of micro-political struggle and their intensity.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Building on institutional theory and recent empirical research, we have suggested that 
the problems of institutional duality within multinationals emerge in a variety of forms 
of micro-politics within multinationals. We suggest that this development of micro-
politics is a distinctive feature of the current economy. It reflects the construction of 
increasingly complex multinational forms based in different institutional contexts. It 
also reflects the uncertainty that actors in these different settings feel about their 
position in the MNC and the consequences of their integration on the local institutional 
system. In some settings characteristic of liberal market economies, management is 
dominated by non-local employees who seek to follow the rules set out by headquarters. 
These actors provide information with minimal manipulation and act as good Boy 
Scouts to further their own career. In other settings with stronger institutional linkages, 
management tends to be locally embedded resistant to over-reliance on the headquarters 
and willing to secure its future in a broader political economy by developing its own on-
the-side activities. These internal features make the multinational a precarious 
organizational form riven by micro-politics. This is exacerbated by the role of the 
capital markets that continually monitor, punish and reward according to performance. 
Senior managers’ main weapon of response to this can be described as organizational 
restructuring but this heightens uncertainty and increases the likelihood that those 
subsidiaries which have the capability will develop their own subversive strategies 
whilst Boy Scouts will gradually be reorganized out of existence. 
 
At this point, our argument is that this particular combination of features has a wider 
significance for the emerging political economy. From our analysis it seems that there is 
the possibility that the competition between different subsidiaries and different types of 
managers may lead to two possible outcomes. In the first outcome, such is the 
commitment of the head office to standardized practices that it enforces these on all its 
subsidiaries. Local resistance is gradually overcome by the insertion of global managers 
with little interest in local networks. The result is an MNC in which subsidiaries are 
increasingly clones of each other. Diversity has reduced and the sources of innovation 
are increasingly derived from outside the firm (from consultants, from new acquisitions, 
from links to universities etc.) because there are no pockets of autonomy, differentiation 
and locally stimulated change. This outcome may satisfy the senior managers as it gives 
them control over subsidiaries and in theory knowledge of their performance thus 
enabling them to persuade their institutional investors that they are in charge and know 
how to manage the next restructuring for financial success. As the economic potential of 
boy-scouts gradually is exploited and their distinctive assets reduced, if not destroyed, 
their usefulness for the MNC begins to disappear. Conformity provides no long-term 
basis for survival and growth.   
 
The other outcome emerges from contexts where subversive strategists are given some 
room for manoeuvre in the context of a more diversified system of control – closer to 
what Hedlund labelled as ‘heterarchy’ (Hedlund 1986). For example, in Kristensen and 
Zeitlin (2005) it is the Danish Horsens plant and in Bélanger’s (1999) study of ABB it is 
a small Finnish plant both with a long-term serving manager that move into the position 
of playing the “bench-mark-setting role” after having been greatly neglected by the 
HQs. Local plants can develop distinctive advantages which they build out of their 
relationships with the institutional context. These are often the basis of new innovations 
in products and processes whilst being very difficult to transfer to other sites which lack 
similar institutional foundations. These advantages, however, can be easily destroyed if 
head offices impose strong global standards and crush local networks. Imposing on 
these subsidiaries targets and processes that destroy their local embeddedness and 
international connectedness would be to destroy key assets that help give the MNC and 
its shareholders the possibility of long-term growth through innovation and diversity.  
 
These two possible outcomes set MNCs a substantial conundrum. The head office 
cannot in the long term have both hierarchical control and performance. Hierarchical 
control reduces uncertainty for head office managers. It creates the basis for a clear 
narrative to institutional investors. On the other hand, it undermines local distinctiveness 
and produces conformity and homogeneity rather than innovation and heterogeneity. 
Overall, then, hierarchical control can produce effective performance results through 
organizational restructurings that reduce costs over the short term. It is less likely to 
produce long term effectiveness as it depends on head office and outside influence for 
innovation. Is it possible to imagine an organizational form in which the subsidiaries are 
given more autonomy and hierarchical control is replaced where HQ executives give up 
the mode of control that today brings them their status in the eyes of the institutional 
equity nexus? Clearly this was Hedlund’s argument (1986; 1999), drawing partly on his 
empirical observations and partly on his normative commitment. Is it likely that this will 
happen? Most likely multinationals will become increasingly squeezed by the sorts of 
processes which we have described and torn between seeking on the one hand to create 
standardized procedures, benchmarks and performances and on the other hand utilizing 
the specific strengths of particular institutional settings. However, so long as this 
remains the case, there exists a form of ‘legitimacy deficit’. Actors within the firm lack 
a commitment to their membership of it as they know that the dynamics of the capital 
market mean that there will be continual restructuring. In the light of this deficit, some 
parts of the MNC look for alternative futures whilst other parts gradually decline and 
disappear. It is hard to see that economic performance will not be affected by this 
uncertainty in the long run. 
 
In conclusion, institutionalist theory can make a fundamental contribution to the 
understanding of multinationals. By emphasizing the socially embedded nature of 
multinationals and the problems of institutional pluralism it opens up a series of 
fascinating questions about how multinationals actually operate in comparison to the 
idealized versions present in many discussions. In this paper, we have sought to show 
the sites of these micro-political struggles in the context of firstly attempts to introduce 
standardization and secondly in the contest over resources within multinationals. We 
have shown furthermore that in the context where capital markets are playing an 
increasingly important role, micro-political struggles will intensify and increase in 
response to the uncertainties. As local sites have different institutional resources, 
responses to these processes will become more diverse pulled between the extremes of a 
Boy Scout orientation, obeying and conforming to the head office, and subversive 
strategists, seeking to defend their continued existence by deepening their local 
embeddedness and from this gaining advantages of flexibility and skill.  What does all 
this mean for the multinational? Is the multinational a stable organizational form or is it 
actually undermining its own conditions of existence and becoming the midwife of a 
new set of relationships between economic actors? These questions offer a serious 
agenda for research in which institutional theory (of both sorts) by offering 
complementary lenses will make a significant contribution. 
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